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ETTLEMENTS
BETWEEN
competitors in patent cases raise
important and

sensitive antitrust issues. Patent settlement agreements may create or maintain a monopoly in
technology or innovation markets and may also
effectuate a monopoly or cartel in related goods markets.
Indeed, absent the patent rights, certain terms of patent settlement agreements may be per se antitrust violations.
Further, anticompetitive patent settlements-unlike most
antitrust conspiracies-are enforceable in court, providing
the parties with an effective means of preventing the cheating that is the bane of cartels. Thus, the antitrust risk that a
settlement agreement may operate as a disguised cartel has
long been recognized.
The antitrust enforcement issues are sensitive because
patent settlements can also promote efficiencies, resolving disputes that might otherwise block or delay the market entry
of valuable inventions. Settlements can reduce the expense
and delay that patent litigation often entails. They enable risk
averse business firms to avoid litigation uncertainty and protect against the unjustified loss of patent rights (and licensing revenues) if a court erroneously holds the patent invalid.
Finally, patent settlements can promote productive technology interchange within industries (at least for non-core technologies).'
Thus, antitrust screening of patent settlements has an
important role to play, identifying antitrust risks and balancing efficiency benefits. However, the antitrust and patent systems are in at least some surface tension because they seek to
advance the social welfare in opposite ways-antitrust by fostering competition; patent law by enabling exclusion. Indeed,
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settlement terms that antitrust law would otherwise regard as
violations may be permissible so long as the patent is valid.
This is one of many factors that constrain effective antitrust
scrutiny of patent settlements. Since the anticompetitive risk
is most acute when patents are weak, invalid, or not infringed,
any precise identification of the antitrust risk would require
assessment of patent validity and scope. But these issues can
only be fully resolved through patent litigation, and settlement
precludes litigation. The alternative of assessing probable
validity and infringement in an antitrust proceeding fails to
provide a tractable or predictive legal standard.
Antitrust scrutiny of patent settlements is further constrained because patent settlements are not disclosed to
enforcement agencies. To be sure, the Patent Act requires filing of interference settlements and collateral agreements
with the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). 2 But it
appears doubtful that the PTO can police disclosure of collateral agreements3 and, under the Third Circuit's decision
in United States v. FMC Corp., the Department of Justice
lacks standing to enforce compliance. The absence of effective disclosure requirements for patent settlements stands in
sharp contrast to disclosure provisions for mergers, R&D
joint ventures, and innovation-related production joint ventures,5 which in the case of mergers requires notification of
the transaction to the antitrust agencies or, in the case of
R&D and production joint ventures, induces notification
through limited antitrust immunity. Finally, defendants in
settlement cases benefit from two legal presumptions that,
while legitimate in themselves, impede antitrust challenge:
a patent is presumed valid,6 and courts have frequently
declared that patent settlements are to be encouraged.
It is important to note, however, that the policy reasons
favoring settlement of litigation generally may not be as
strong in patent cases as in others. The Patent Act is imbued
with the public interest, a fact reflected in its constitutional
basis. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution
empowers Congress "To promote the Progress of... the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the
exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries." In promoting
"Progress" and thereby enhancing the social welfare, the
Patent Act grants exclusive rights to inventors of those inventions that meet the statute's multiple standards for protection.
Generally, inventions that do not meet such standards are
either protected under the far weaker state law system of
trade secret 7 or not at all. Like patented inventions, this latter, unpatented and unprotected group provides a basis for
further progress. Lack of competition resulting from an
invalid patent or one that is not infringed costs society something, including the "Progress" the Patent Act was intended
to foster. Because private settlements fail to take this public
interest into account, they are inherently more troubling in
the patent context than others in which the integrity of a federal system of protection-and non-protection-of innovation is not implicated.
Recent lower court decisions8 and federal enforcement
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actions' in the pharmaceutical industry have brought the
settlement issue to the forefront of antitrust concern. The
pharmaceutical industry operates under a unique regulatory
structure-the Hatch-Waxman Act 1°-that heightens the
risk of anticompetitive settlements. Briefly, the HatchWaxman Act contains several important features. It permits
a generic drug manufacturer seeking FDA approval to file an
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA). The ANDA
may incorporate the safety and efficacy data contained in the
earlier application of the corresponding brand name drug as
long as the generic is the brand name drug's bioequivalent.
However, an ANDA filer must provide some assurance that
entry of a generic substitute will not be barred by existing
patent rights in the brand name product (pioneer patents).
One option for an ANDA filer is to certify that the particular pioneer patent at issue is either invalid or not infringed by
the generic drug. To encourage generic drug companies to
challenge patents, the Act grants the first ANDA filer who
makes such a certification a period of marketing exclusivity.
The exclusivity period begins at the earlier of the date on
which the generic drug manufacturer begins commercial
marketing or the date on which a court holds the pioneer
patent invalid or not infringed, and extends for 180 days.
Unintentionally, Congress created a system that can be
used strategically to prevent competition and raise consumer
prices. This has led to a series of recent cases in which the government or private parties have argued that brand name and
generic manufacturers have made just such a strategic-and
unlawful-use of the system. The most important issue in
these cases centers on the effect of so-called "reverse payments" used in combination with the 180-day marketing
exclusivity described above. In a reverse payment settlement,
the pioneer patent holder, having brought an infringement
suit against the generic producer, typically pays the generic
"infringer" a large sum to defer marketing of the generic
drug and to agree not to transfer its rights to the 180-day
exclusivity period. By this means, the pioneer blocks all
generic entry until the agreed date (the "cork-in-the-bottle"
effect)." Some courts have held such payments to be per se
antitrust violations, and have also found such agreements to
be anticompetitive when they bar the generic from assigning
or relinquishing the 180-day exclusivity right, or from offering other competing, non-infringing drug products. 2 The
FTC has also challenged such agreements, and obtained consent judgments under Section 5 of the FTC Act.13
In response, pharmaceutical defendants have urged that a
full rule of reason analysis is required, under which the government or private plaintiff would have to prove the probable invalidity or non-infringement of the pioneer patents.
Depending on the estimated strength of the patent rights,
defendants argue that reverse payments can achieve efficiencies in enabling early resolution of claims of patent invalidity
and infringement. They further assert that collateral agreements delaying introduction of alleged infringing drug products by generic producers or even non-infringing substitutes,
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are necessary to facilitate settlements of the patent litigation.
Finally, defendants argue that patent settlements are
immune from antitrust challenge under the Nerr-Pennington
doctrine, which immunizes government petitioning.14 The
settlement, they argue, is simply a step in the prosecution of
a patent infringement action. Since prosecution of a lawsuit
is immune petitioning, they argue that a settlement should
similarly be immune. In response, the government and private litigants assert that settlements reflect purely private
conduct and involve no substantive petitioning. The settlement agreement involves no independent action by the court
nor is it incidental to infringement litigation. Unlike a prelitigation threat to enforce a patent, which has been held
incidental under Nerr,"5 the settlement does not involve a
unilateral demand for relief of the type a court could impose
in an infringement case. Instead, the settlement encompasses an agreement between potential competitors that may
allocate markets or contain other anticompetitive terms wholly collateral to the issue of patent infringement. Nor would
judicial approval of the settlement change the analysis because
it involves no substantive petitioning, but under present
practice is essentially formalistic and ministerial in nature,
involving only the parties to the agreement. 16
While the pharmaceutical cases focus on a particular regulatory scheme, they raise the concern that in a world in which
the extent and protection of patent and other intellectual
property is rapidly increasing, patent settlements generally
may require closer antitrust scrutiny. The presence of patents
and the existence of a patent infringement suit does, however, make the antitrust analysis more complex than in nonpatent cases in two important respects. First, the issue is often
formulated as not simply whether a trade restraint reduces
competition that would exist in the absence of the restraint,
but whether in addition the restraint is more anticompetitive
than the outcome of the patent litigation would be.17 Second,
the infringement action itself serves the vital competitive purpose of policing the validity and scope of patents where other
constraining mechanisms are largely absent (apart from the
examination of the invention's "patent-worthiness" by the
PTO prior to the issuance of the patent)-a purpose all the
more necessary in view of the multiplying number of new
patents and the high casualty rate of those litigated.
Possible Approaches
We have already mentioned the difficulty of basing antitrust
policy on assessments of patent validity and infringement.
What other avenues are available? We suggest that the following approaches merit consideration: (1) disclosure provisions that would provide more information on the largely
secret world of patent settlement agreements; (2) incentivesbased analysis that would focus on whether the settlement
agreement creates anticompetitive incentives; and (3) development of other indicators to identify anticompetitive
settlements.
1. Disclosure Provisions. Antitrust history and the

recent pharmaceutical cases show that settlement agreements
can raise significant antitrust risks. Because such agreements
are largely private, the scope of the antitrust risk is unknown.
Thus, a vital first step in devising antitrust policy for settlement agreements is to gain more knowledge through mechanisms for disclosure to antitrust enforcement agencies.
Some additional information may soon be forthcoming.
The FTC is presently investigating generic drug competition
in the pharmaceutical industry. This may provide information about current settlement agreements, but it will of course
be limited to a single industry. Other steps that merit consideration include (1) empowerment of antitrust agencies to
enforce Patent Act disclosure requirements for interference
settlements; (2) notification to antitrust enforcement agencies of settlement agreements between generic and brand
name producers of pharmaceutical drug products; and (3)
notifications to antitrust agencies of patent settlement agreements in infringement cases generally.
As noted earlier, in FMC Corp., the Third Circuit held that
the Justice Department lacks standing to enforce compliance with Section 135 of the Patent Act, which requires disclosure of patent interference settlements to the PTO. Either
through statutory amendment of Section 135 or reversal of
the FMC case, the antitrust agencies should have standing
to enforce disclosure of interference settlements, including
side agreements. This is not a complete solution, however.
Because the PTO is not able to police the side agreement disclosure requirement, the antitrust agencies will only rarely
have knowledge of a failure to file such agreements.18
A second disclosure proposal, pending in Congress, focuses specifically on the pharmaceutical industry. The Leahy,
Kohl, Schumer & Durbin Bill (S.754)19 would require disclosure to the FTC and Department of Justice of agreements
between a generic and brand name drug manufacturer which
limit the research, development, manufacture, marketing, or
selling of a generic drug product. In addition to providing the
full text of the agreement, the parties would have to explain
the purpose and scope of the agreement, and whether it
could restrain or limit the production, manufacture or sale of
the generic version of the drug. The Bill, which has been
approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee, thus focuses
narrowly on the issues raised by the current pharmaceutical
cases, and appears amply justified in view of the antitrust
problems that have been identified in recent cases and
enforcement proceedings.
A third settlement notification proposal made by a former
head of the Antitrust Division, Joel Klein,2" and a similar proposal by another former head of the Division, William
Baxter,2 would require notification generally of patent settlement agreements in infringement cases meeting certain
threshold criteria. This would subject patent settlements to
a notification procedure which might bear some similarity to
merger prenotification22 or the more abbreviated procedures
of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act.
Some will argue that a notification procedure would be bur-

densome, but the increasing importance of patents and the
need to assure that patent rights are not expanded beyond
their proper scope argues in favor of this23extension of reporting requirements in infringement cases.
2. Incentives-BasedAnalysis. Patent settlements are a
focal point of antitrust concern because they can distort competitive incentives among the litigants and because of the
absence of any public enforcement presence. To illustrate,
consider this simple example. A patent holder with a monopoly in a well defined market sues a single infringer (the "challenger") who seeks to make and sell the patented product. In
the infringement action, the patent holder and the challenger confront each other as competitors for the patent
right, testing its validity and scope. If the challenger prevails, the market will be opened to competition. If the patent
holder prevails, its existing monopoly will be confirmed, presumably with justification. In the absence of anticompetitive
collateral agreements, the incentives of the parties are correctly aligned in the public interest, and should reflect the
perceived strength of their patent rights.
The Reverse Payment Cases. The basic problem in the
pharmaceutical settlement cases is the skewing of the competitive incentives of the generic manufacturer. As a competitor of the pioneer patent owner, the generic has incentives
that would normally be aligned with the consumer interest.
The harder it competes with the pioneer in bringing its
generic version of the drug to market, the better off are consumers. By allowing the generic to share the monopoly rents
of the pioneer, the pharmaceutical settlements have compromised this incentive. Some would address this problem by
requiring the government or private litigant to prove the
invalidity or non-infringement of the patent to determine
whether the expected value to consumers from continued
patent litigation is higher than the expected value from the
settlement agreements. But, as we have noted already, determination of patent validity is not a feasible standard for an
antitrust tribunal.
A more effective antitrust approach to the reverse payment
cases would be to minimize so far as possible the distortion
of the generic's competitive incentives through rent sharing
with the pioneer. Thus, we agree with Commissioner Leary's
recent suggestion that settlement agreements in HatchWaxman cases should be limited to delayed entry by the
generic producer (and of course may also provide for payment of royalties by the generic manufacturer). The payment or giving of any other consideration to the generic
manufacturer should be at least presumptively unlawful (if
not per se unlawful), with the burden of proof on the parties
to justify the payment.24
Under this approach, the government or private enforcer
would not have to prove the strength of the pioneer's patent
rights because the pioneer and the generic producer-the
parties who have the best information-would rely on their
own assessments of validity in negotiating the date of generic entry.25 Thus, holding the generic royalty level constant, a
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strong claim of non-infringement or patent invalidity by the
generic would face little entry delay, while a weak claim
would face long entry delay-a result consistent with the
policies underlying the patent laws and the Hatch-Waxman
Act. The only way the pioneer could persuade the generic
producer to extend the delay period would be by lowering the
generic's royalty rate, which in itself produces some consumer benefit. But even the pioneer's offer of a royalty-free
license would have limited delaying value when the generic's
claims are strong in view of the diminishing present value the
generic realizes from future income.
Limiting the "coin" of settlements to delayed entry and the
royalty to be paid by the generic manufacturer is vastly superior to requiring proof of patent invalidity. Thus, confining
the terms of settlement to the time of generic entry and the
royalty to be paid by the generic removes the incentive distortion involved in reverse payments. It thereby provides the
legal rule that appears most likely to lead to effective administration and minimal antitrust regulation.26
Additionally, the 180-day exclusivity provision in the
Hatch-Waxman Act may be reformed to lessen the likelihood
of anticompetitive settlements in the pharmaceutical industry. Amending the Hatch-Waxman Act to limit the generic's
ability to delay the start of the 180-day exclusivity period
would lessen the likelihood that a brand name manufacturer would find it economically feasible to prevent generic
competition. The "cork-in-the-bottle" effect, referred to
above, occurs because the particular structure of the Act permits an agreement between the brand name manufacturer
and first ANDA filer to block all subsequent filers from the
market. Appropriate amendment of the Hatch-Waxman Act
would make a strategy aimed at implementing the cork-inthe-bottle effect less feasible.27
3. Other Indicators ofAnticompetitive Settlements.
The risk of anticompetitive settlements extends beyond the
reverse payment cases. While older cases have relied heavily
on intent, it would be highly advantageous to develop more
objective indicators. We believe at least one is promising:
the payment of trivial royalties in an industry-wide licensing
arrangement involving the fixing of price or output of
licensees. In addition, even the intent issue might be handled
more effectively by emphasizing objective evidence of intent.
Trivial Royalty Settlements. In a trivial royalty settlement,
the patent holder licenses the patent without requiring the
licensee to pay a significant royalty. It is immediately apparent that the trivial royalty is a weaker case of reverse payment.
But it differs from the pharmaceutical settlements in that the
patent holder receives no significant other consideration from
its licensees, such as deferral of entry. If the settlement
involves industry-wide licensing that fixes licensee prices or
output, the agreement may be a disguised cartel.
In a seminal article, George Priest has identified the trivial royalty as an important indicator of a patent cartel (to be
confirmed by other evidence).28 Priest reasons that the patent
holder with a valuable patent will seek to maximize its return
56
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through a high royalty, while holding licensee profits to the
competitive level. Thus, absence of significant royalties
appears inconsistent with full patent exploitation because it
involves a sharing of the patent rent with licensees. On the
other hand, a trivial royalty is consistent with a licenseepatentee cartel. If the patent is invalid or has little value, the
patent holder can maximize its profit by organizing a cartel
at the licensee level, splitting the cartel return with its licensees
and avoiding possible invalidation of its patent. Thus, a patent
license which imposes only trivial royalties on licensees is an
indicator of a possible patent-based cartel 29
when accompanied
by the fixing of licensee prices or output.
Priest would confirm the cartel diagnosis by examining
changes in price, output, and market share, particularly in
response to variations in manufacturing costs. Stability of
market shares, output, and price tend to indicate a cartel. A
cartel manager would try to hold prices and market shares stable, and maintain a price umbrella over less efficient firms to
avoid the disruptions and shocks that can undermine the cartel. On the other hand, a patent monopolist will seek to
induce competition at the licensee level, which leads to changing market shares, fluctuations in price as manufacturing costs
increase or decrease, and exit of less efficient firms.
The trivial royalty issue can also be analyzed in incentive
terms. The absence of a significant royalty removes the
licensee's incentive to challenge the patent owner's patent
rights and to assert its own rights in a manner similar to the
reverse payment. The difference is that in the trivial royalty
case, the challenger is compensated by sharing in a licenseepatentee cartel. While a cartel diagnosis based on economic
indicators alone becomes clear only over time, the presence
of a trivial royalty could provide a useful ex ante indicator to
enforcement agencies of possible anticompetitive licensing.
Intent Evidence. Intent evidence is often disfavored in
modern antitrust analysis, which prefers to focus on the
effects of a transaction. At the same time, the Supreme Court,
and most recently, the court of appeals in Microsoft, recognized that when direct evidence is lacking, intent evidence
may be used to prove effects. 3 Patent settlements are just such
a case. The settlement may involve collateral agreements that
would be per se violations in the absence of the patent rights.
In such cases, the effects from an antitrust perspective will
inevitably appear anticompetitive. Perhaps for this reason
the patent settlement cases have placed greater weight on
intent evidence than modern antitrust generally. However,
following modern tendencies, appropriate intent evidence
should be objective in nature, involving corporate meetings,
contemporaneous business documents showing specific plans
and program, and the reasons they were undertaken, rather
than subjective expressions of attitude or state of mind. Such
evidence will show deliberate corporate action that is likely
to be profitable only because of the expected cartelization of
the market. Under these circumstances, intent evidence may
be particularly helpful in determining the presence of a patent
cartel.3"

Conclusion
Patent settlements can be a potent source of antitrust abuse,
as evidenced by the recent pharmaceutical settlements.
Effective antitrust policy is impeded by the private nature of
patent settlements and the complexity of accommodating
both antitrust and patent goals, including the inability of an
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Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803, 868-70 (1988).
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settlement agreements and the use of intent as a supplemental factor when other evidence is lacking. We finally suggest,
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